In just ten years, Cameroon’s state budget has more than doubled, soaring from CFAF 3,746.6 billion in 2015 to CFAF 8,816.4 billion in 2026. Yet, while these figures suggest an ever-expanding state with growing financial muscle; one fundamental question continues to haunt ordinary citizens: where, exactly, does all this money go?

A close examination of the budget settlement laws—the documents that definitively establish how budgets approved by the National Assembly have been executed—as well as assessment reports by the IMF and the World Bank, leads to an unmistakable conclusion: over the past decade, the country’s financial choices have been dominated by the crushing burden of public debt, the bloated operating costs of state institutions, and the embezzlement of public funds, all at the expense of productive investment and social spending.

1. Debt Servicing: The Country’s Biggest Budget Drain

Public funds go first and foremost towards paying off debts. In 2024 alone, public debt servicing accounted for 24% of the state’s total expenditure authorized for payment, with more than CFAF 1,600 billion actually executed out of a projected CFAF 2,252 billion. Public debt has surged from less than 25% of GDP in 2015 to more than 43% in 2024, choking life out of the economy. IMF assessment reports warn of a high risk of debt distress, forcing the state to devote nearly one CFA franc out of every four solely to repaying the principal and interest on its debt. In other words, an enormous share of the nation’s wealth is swallowed up by debt repayment before it can be put to productive use. How can an economy develop when so much of its financial resources are consumed by financial commitments accumulated over the years?

2. Government Operating Costs and the Public-Sector Wage Bill

In 2024, personnel expenditure reached CFAF 1,490.5 billion, representing 22.6% of expenditure authorized for payment. Over the past decade, the public-service wage bill has risen by more than 60%, while the state has failed to generate economic growth commensurate with that increase. Worse still, spending on goods and services, together with the operating costs of ministries and other public institutions, accounts for a structural block of approximately 25% of annual budgets. This bloated machinery of government is repeatedly accompanied by unpaid bills and mounting payment arrears, as illustrated by the state’s unpaid rental obligations. The state continues to consume an ever-larger share of national resources, yet citizens are left wondering where the promised development has gone. The machinery of government keeps running, the bills keep piling up, and the population continues to wait for the basic services it is entitled to receive.

3. Embezzlement of Public Funds: A Scourge That Keeps Growing

If the National Anti-Corruption Commission (CONAC), in its annual report for the 2025 financial year, records financial losses to the state of only CFAF 6.2 billion, it is because, over time, hardly is anyone being prosecuted anymore! CONAC only deals with cases that have been reported and/or formally brought before it. The embezzlement cases traced and pursued by the courts and oversight bodies account for less than 2% of the consolidated budget. But what does that figure really tell us about the scale of corruption in Cameroon? When one examines reports from development partners, the picture is far more disturbing. The actual, systemic scale of embezzlement—through inflated invoices, waste, fraud, fictitious project execution, paid absenteeism involving ghost civil servants, and unauthorized transfers outside the budget—is estimated at approximately 15% of the actual value of the annual national budget. The bitter truth is that corruption has become normal practice in Cameroon. One of the issues most frequently evoked in World Bank and IMF reports on Cameroon concerns subsidies for petroleum products. Between 2015 and 2023, these subsidies cost the public treasury more than CFAF 2,000 billion. They call it a subsidy, yet, within the pricing structure of a liter of fuel, it is the consumer who pays. So where does the money go?

Consumers are also being made to foot the bill for the reconstruction of SONARA, the country’s national oil refinery. Yet the announced funding has already been collected several times over, with nothing to show for it! How many times must the same project be financed before the public sees tangible results? How long can a system continue to announce budgets, collect money, and leave citizens wondering what happened to it? Worse still, assessment reports from development partners estimate that embezzlement causes efficiency losses of up to 30% of the Public Investment Budget (PIB). Over the past decade, this translates into a real shortfall of as much as CFAF 4,000 billion in infrastructure development—roads, schools, hospitals, and other essential public facilities. The physical headcount operation for state personnel (COPPE) uncovered tens of thousands of ghost public employees or workers in irregular situations over the decade. Undue salaries paid and subsequently recovered amounted to as much as CFAF 600 billion over the same period, equivalent to approximately 4% of the public-sector wage bill. Even more alarming, an in-depth audit of budget chapters 65 (operating interventions) and 94 (investment interventions) over the decade revealed that nearly CFAF 1,000 billion had simply evaporated through payments to hidden companies or interventions for which no credible supporting documents could be produced. And yet, as I have repeatedly said, Operation Sparrow hawk (Opération Épervier) has proved to be a political operation, selectively targeting its prey.

4. Committed but Undisbursed Balances:

Borrowing Money That Cannot Be Used: One of the recurring criticisms raised by the National Assembly during debates on budget settlement laws concerns the execution rate of capital expenditure under the Public Investment Budget (PIB). For years, the country has been confronted with chronic under-execution of its budget and underutilization of borrowed funds. Over the past decade, the share of committed but undisbursed balances (Soldes Engagés Non Décaissés — SEND) has been particularly high, reportedly reaching as much as 70% of the overall annual budget—approximately two-thirds of the state budget—and representing nearly 15% of GDP. Outstanding SEND balances consist of external loans signed with Technical and Financial Partners (TFPs) but not yet disbursed. These balances have risen sharply as financing agreements have accumulated. In 2025, they reached the alarming level of CFAF 5,100 billion, equivalent to nearly 70% of all the resources and expenditures budgeted for that financial year. The opportunity costs and commitment fees associated with these immobilized funds are substantial. Cameroon is trapped in the syndrome of weak absorption capacity: it signs financing agreements, accumulates loans, and incurs costs, yet struggles to translate those commitments into completed projects and tangible benefits for the population. But must this situation be accepted as inevitable? The problems are well known and should be addressed: projects that are insufficiently mature, delays in expropriation procedures, slow disbursements, and cumbersome public procurement processes. The country does not simply need more money. It needs the capacity, discipline, and political will to turn the money it already has into roads, hospitals, schools, electricity networks, and other infrastructure that citizens can actually use. What is the point of negotiating loans and announcing financing agreements if the money remains undisbursed while development projects stagnate? A country cannot build its future on financing commitments that remain trapped on paper.

Conclusion: Public Money Must Serve the People, Not the State Machinery

Looking back at Cameroon’s budget execution over the past ten years, one is struck by a disturbing conclusion: only about 15% of public money was devoted to financing roads, hospitals, schools, electricity networks, and other essential infrastructure. The central challenge facing Cameroon’s public finances is no longer simply the ability to collect revenue or borrow money. It is the quality of public spending—and, above all, the political choices governing how that money is used. A state that continually expands its budget, accumulates debt, spends heavily on its own operations, and allows public funds to disappear without adequate accountability cannot credibly claim that its financial management is serving the interests of the people. Cameroon does not merely have a problem of insufficient resources. It has a problem of priorities, accountability, and the quality of governance. Without bold restructuring that gives absolute priority to productive, growth-generating investment, the state’s money will continue to serve the state machinery itself and the repayment of its debts, rather than the people whose labor, taxes, and sacrifices sustain the nation. The question therefore remains: where does the state’s money go? Until the authorities provide a convincing answer through transparent accounts, effective sanctions, and visible results on the ground, Cameroonians will have every reason to keep asking.